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Book Review
Reflections on the McRevolution: A Review of
Jihad vs. McWorld: How the Planet Is Both Falling
Apart and Coming Together and What This Means
for Democracy, by Benjamin R. Barber
Times Books, 1995,381 pp.
REVIEWED BY DAVID P. FIDLER*
In 1790, Edmund Burke published a book warning Britain and Europe of
the great threat posed by the violent upheaval of the French Revolution.'
Burke went to great lengths to demonstrate that the real threat posed by the
French Revolution was its ideology, which could cross borders and corrupt the
hearts and minds of people in every country in Europe. Burke feared that the
Jacobin ideology would undermine and eventually destroy the British
constitution and European civilization unless Britain and its allies crushed the
evil before it could work its wicked ways. Burke's Reflections on the
Revolution in France was read and debated at the highest levels of British
political society.
In 1995, Benjamin R. Barber published a book warning the United States
and other liberal democracies of the threat posed by the processes of
globalization--the universal dominance of a capitalist inspired, consumer-
monopolizing ideology (McWorld) and the often violent ethnic, racial, and
religious backlashes against the rapid homogenizing of society and soul
produced by capitalism's global expansion (Jihad).2 Barber goes to great
lengths to demonstrate that the real threat posed by McWorld is its
"videology,"3 which crosses borders and corrupts the hearts and minds of
people in every country in the world. Barber fears that the videology of
* Associate Professor of Law, Indiana University School of Law (Bloomington).
1. Edmund Burke, Reflections on the Revolution in France, in 8 THE WRITINGS AND SPEECHES OF
EDMUND BURKE 53 (L.G. Mitchell ed., 1989).
2. BENJAMIN R. BARBER, JIHAD VS. MCWORLD: How THE PLANET IS BOTH FALLING APART AND
COMING TOGETHER AND WHAT THIS MEANS FOR DEMOCRACY (1995). This book elaborates a thesis Barber
first introduced in an article in The Atlantic and which he further explored in a previous edition of this
Journal. See Benjamin R. Barber, Global Democracy or Global Law: Which Comes First? I IND. J.
GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 119 (1993).
3. BARBER, supra note 2, at 17.
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McWorld is undermining democracy and the nation-state through its
strangulation of culture and civil society and through its twisted conspiracy
with Jihad, which violently convulses against McWorld's onslaught while
embracing McWorld's methods. Barber's reflections on the McRevolution4
in the world are being read and discussed at the highest levels of American
politics. President Clinton, for example, has publicly praised and
recommended Jihad vs. McWorld.
Burke's Reflections and Barber's Jihad vs. Mc World are both conservative
works seeking to protect traditional society and politics against radical
innovations that threaten to undermine fundamental values and belief systems.
Burke's warnings about the French Revolution proved prophetic as the
Revolution descended into terror and militaristic despotism. Whether Barber's
warnings about the McRevolution prove equally prophetic remains to be seen,
but Barber's fears and prognostications about the demise of democracy and the
nation-state under the impact of the McRevolution are difficult to accept
because they are not supported by a persuasive historical analysis or normative
argument.
I. THE MCREVOLUTION
A. The Dynamics of the McRevolution
The McRevolution in international affairs that Barber fears has two key
forces: McWorld and Jihad. "McWorld" is Barber's metaphor for the product
of the process by which globally-expansionist capitalism presses "nations into
one homogenous global theme park ... tied together by communications,
information, entertainment, and commerce."6 McWorld is a reality in which
everything is contrived, artificial, and "imagineered" 7--everything, that is,
except profit. Culture, individual responsibility, political accountability,
4. "McRevolution" is not Barber's term but my own attempt to capture the supposedly revolutionary
nature of the developments Barber analyzes.
5. See Remarks at a Breakfast with Religious Leaders, 31 WKLY. COMP. PRES. DOc. 1521, 1525
(Sept. 8, 1995). President Clinton's praise for Jihad vs. McWorld is ironic because Barber attacks the North
American Free Trade Agreement-one of President Clinton's proudest accomplishments-as "McWorld's
global strategy in its North American guise." BARBER, supra note 2, at 98. President Clinton has also
appeared on MTV, which Barber slams as "mindless." Id at 109. President Clinton is, therefore, both a
creator and consumer of McWorld-the very thing Barber identifies as corruptive of democracy.
6. BARBER, supra note 2, at 4.
7. Id. at 97.
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concepts of community, notions of civic responsibility, and democracy itself
are jettisoned in favor of an ideology that maximizes profits while reducing
life's meaning to eating at McDonald's, watching MTV, or visiting a mall. It
is important to grasp how comprehensive and powerful Barber believes
McWorld is: Barber believes the forces creating McWorld corrupt the
individual soul, undermine communities, erode the nation-state, destroy
democracy, and reduce international relations to the dynamics of shopping at
a mall or visiting a theme park. The scope of Barber's "McWorld" is
breathtaking, which is one reason (though by no means the only reason) why
we should pause to catch our breath before we buy into this concept.
"Jihad" is Barber's metaphor for the yearning "to recapture a world that
existed prior to cosmopolitan capitalism and was defined by religious
mysteries, hierarchical communities, spellbinding traditions, and historical
torpor."8  Jihad represents a force in the world opposed to the culture
homogenizing, profit maximizing spirit of McWorld. Barber contrasts Jihad,
which he claims is a sort of "post-modern 'new' nationalism" with "traditional
nationalism."9 Jihad has "the nation-state as its target" while old-fashioned
nationalism was the source of the nation-state.'0 Examples of Jihad include:
(1) Jihad within democracies, which (except for Germany) is a pacific, pallid
version of Jihad,1 (2) Jihad within Asia, which takes two forms (a) internal
Jihad against Asian states by cultural minorities, and (b) external Jihad by
Asian states reasserting "Asian values" against the western values of
McWorld, 2 (3) Jihad within transitional democracies, 3 which takes a tribal
form that is "antipluralist and antimodern, ' ' and (4) Jihad in the Islamic
world, which Barber terms "essential Jihad" because its opposition to
McWorld stems from religious tenets.' Like Barber's use of McWorld as a
metaphor, Jihad in Barber's analysis covers a vast array of political, social, and
cultural phenomena.
Barber attempts to demonstrate in Part I of his book the rise of McWorld.
He argues that dependence on foreign sources of natural resources has
eliminated all prospects for economic self-sufficiency and rendered "debate
8. Id. at 157.
9. Id. at 165.
10. Id.
11. Id. atch. 11.
12. Id. at ch. 12.
13. Id. atch. 13.
14. Id. at 196.
15. Id atch. 14.
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about national interest or natural independence ... increasingly irrelevant."' 6
The "resource imperative" embodies the "enhanced interdependence"' 7 needed
by McWorld and the potential "divisiveness, injustice, and weakness""8-traits
of Jihad-created by the discrepancies between developed and developing
countries' use of mineral and energy resources. The patterns of resource usage
in the international system weaken the nation-state through dependence on
foreign sources of energy and minerals and through the agitation of anti-
modem political forces within nation-states that export energy and mineral
resources to developed countries. The changing nature of industrial
production from a predominantly national activity to a transnational endeavor
also undermines the nation-state. 9 But what really serves as the powerful
dynamic for McWorld is the transition from hard goods (industrial products)
to soft goods (knowledge, information, and entertainment) and from soft goods
to services (what Barber calls the "infotainment telesector").'
The cutting edge of McWorld, and the source of great dangers for
democracy in Barber's opinion, is the growing economic power of
information, telecommunication, and entertainment services.2 The growing
importance of the global infotainment telesector explains the frenzy of media
mergers and acquisitions in the United States and elsewhere that Barber
surveys with a critical and concerned eye.' Lurking within the infotainment
telesector is the "telesector videology," a post-modem ideology that trumpets
materialism and consumption as ends in themselves through the powerful
medium of homogenized, U.S.-style telecommunications.'
The objective of the telesector videology is the creation and perpetuation
of "Planet Hollywood." Barber wants us to understand that the advent of
McWorld is not just an economic transformation of international affairs but a
profoundly political event. McWorld is in search of citizens, not citizens as
democrats but as consumers. Its targets are political and cultural institutions
that stand in the way of the promotion of the "values necessary to material
consumption."' Governments stand helplessly by as multinational companies
16. Id. at 34.
17. Id. at 43.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 54.
20. Id. at 80.
21. Id. at 77.
22. Id. at ch. 9.
23. Id. at ch. 6.
24. Id. at 109.
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create monopolies in the infotainment telesector, and cultures suffer, via
satellite, the numbing and dumbing effects of McDonald's, MTV, and Beavis
and Butthead. The hard, identifiable sovereignty of states seeps almost
imperceptibly into the hands of the Berlusconis, Turners, and Murdochs of
McWorld.
Interestingly, Barber does not present the vast array of forces he identifies
under the rubric "Jihad" as a simple conglomeration of reactionary efforts
against the onslaught of McWorld. Barber wants us to see Jihad and McWorld
as dialectical: McWorld fosters Jihad, Jihad nurtures McWorld. This
seemingly illogical relationship has at its heart the idea of culture as
commodity. McWorld needs cultural diversity (the seedbed of Jihad) to sell
cultural homogeneity. The realm of Jihad ironically constitutes the emerging
markets of McWorld. Further, Jihad unwittingly prepares the path for
McWorld by undermining the nation-state from within and by discrediting
notions of cultural diversity and conservation." Barber's dialectic, like
Marx's, has an end point. The winner in the long term, Barber predicts, will
eventually be McWorld.26
B. The Dangers of the McRevolution
As previously mentioned, Barber finds in McWorld a grave threat to the
nation-state, democracy, civil society, and the human soul. McWorld's attack
is essentially a two-pronged attack on democracy according to Barber. First,
McWorld inculcates the values of materialism into the lives of its victims,
reducing the capacity of individuals to create and sustain the institutions and
dynamics of civil society-churches, civic organizations, schools, and
community identity and spirit. Barber believes that a healthy democracy needs
a healthy civil society because the latter develops in the people the deliberative
capacities needed for democratic government. McWorld serves the passions
of personal gratification and erodes the ability to deliberate about public
goods. Second, McWorld destroys the nation-state, which Barber believes has
served as the best foundation for democratic politics yet found. Since global
democracy and city-state democracy are equally unrealistic, Barber believes
that democracy's historical relationship with the nation-state remains vital to
the future of democracy. But, as Barber observes, while democracies prefer
25. Id at 5.
26. Id. at 82.
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markets, markets--particularly global markets--do not necessarily prefer
democracy.
C. The Confederal Counter-Revolution
Barber offers a solution to the McRevolution that relies on
confederalism.27 In starting a global counter-revolution, Barber would have us
forget ideas of global government, international law, and further partition of
nation-states to embrace a global confederal strategy. Barber recommends the
American Articles of Confederation as "relevant reading."2 Barber wants to
counter the McRevolution by reforming the international system on the Swiss
confederal model.29 Barber believes that a confederal counter-revolution "may
offer a viable alternative" because it would give states "sufficient time to live
together to discover the need for more integrative remedies--and to acquire the
trust and tolerance in which such remedies depend" and "offers a gradualist,
voluntary, trust-building strategy of supranationality."3
II. THE MCREVOLUTION?
Barber's thesis that democracy is being crushed by the dialectical vise
formed by McWorld and Jihad is provocative mainly because it pits
democracy and capitalism as the great antagonists of this post-modem
historical period. As he points out, the traditional liberal assumption is that
capitalism and democracy are allies, and that where one goes the other is sure
to follow. Barber is re-visiting an old controversy that extends back to Adam
Smith: Does capitalism require democratic political institutions? Joseph
Cropsey interpreted Smith as believing that free political institutions are
necessary to the preservation of commerce.3 Albert Hirschman, on the other
hand, believed that Smith thought "that economics can go it alone: within
wide limits of tolerance, political progress is not needed as a prerequisite for,
nor is it likely to be a consequence of, economic advance."32 This debate is
27. Id. at 290.
28. Id. at 289.
29. Id. at 290.
30. Id.
31. JOSEPH CROPSEY, POLITY AND ECONOMY: AN INTERPRETATION OF THE PRINCIPLES OF ADAM
SMITH 95 (1957).
32. ALBERT O. HIRSCHMAN, THE PASSIONS AND THE INTERESTS 103-04 (1977).
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alive today in the recent controversy about "Asian values," a phrase denoting
the Asian preference for vigorous capitalism and more authoritarian politics
than practiced in the West. Barber is clearly in agreement with Hirschman
because he believes, and attempts to demonstrate that, capitalism pursued
globally does establish or promote democracy. He also uses Asia as an
example to support his assertion.3 Barber gives this old controversy a new
twist by positing a dialectical relationship between two apparently opposite
forces: nationalism and globalization. Barber's book poses a challenge
because he forces us to question the association of capitalism and democracy
and the assumption that nationalism and globalization are antithetical. In
Barber's analysis, opposites attract and the seemingly harmonious engage in
a bitter struggle for dominance. Barber's unconventional approach, combined
with his often pungent rhetoric, makes Jihad vs. McWorld an entertaining read.
Upon deeper and more sober reflection, however, entertainment constitutes
one of the few positive characteristics of Barber's book. Barber's key
analytical devices-McWorld, Jihad, and their dialectical relationship-do not
withstand scrutiny. Further, after the roar Barber emits in his attack on
McWorld, his confederal counter-revolution concludes the book not with a
bang but with a whimper. In fact, the weakness of Barber's response to the
McRevolution underscores the fragility of his analytical approach.
A. Capitalism and Democracy
Underneath Barber's dislike of McWorld resides a more fundamental
dislike of capitalism. 4 Although Barber focuses mainly on McWorld's
destruction of the nation-state and democracy around the globe, he also makes
it clear that he distrusts capitalism deeply. His warning that the infotainment
telesector and its videology undermine civil society contains within it the
warning that capitalism as an economic system and philosophy is the enemy
of a deliberative citizenry. Barber separates a society into three countervailing
forces: the government, civil society, and private enterprise. Barber believes
33. BARBER, supra note 2, at 185.
34. Other reviewers of Jihad vs. McWorld have commented on Barber's negative attitude towards
capitalism. Francis Fukuyama claims Barber's book "is marred... by his snobbish distaste for capitalism."
Francis Fukuyama, Book Review: Jihad vs. McWorld, FoREIGN AFF., Nov./Dec. 1995, at 116. Martin Sieff
notes Barber's "loathing for large-scale free market capitalism" and dismisses Jihad vs. McWorld as "the
latest fashionable excuse to hate the free market." Martin Sieff, Trendy Excuse to Hate Free Markets,
WASH. TtMEs, Sept. 16, 1995, at C3 (book review).
19963
GLOBAL LEGAL STUDIES JOURNAL
that the key force is civil society because it limits the government's power and
blunts the brutal logic of the free market. Further, Barber favors a very
activist, regulatory government as an additional bulwark against the effects of
capitalism. If civil society is destroyed, tyranny of either the state or the
market washes over citizens and turns them into either oppressed peoples or
consumer drones. Barber clearly thinks that, in McWorld, governments are
increasingly helpless and citizens resemble more and more vapid mall
shoppers. The McRevolution has overturned the balance of power in society.
The villain in Barber's analysis is capitalism.
The biggest problem with Barber's depiction of capitalism is his
unwillingness to see any effects in free markets that bolster civil society,
active government, and democracy. He is so anti-free market that he makes
what must historically be considered incredible assertions. Barber seriously
questions whether Germans living in east Berlin really have more liberty now
that neon Coca-Cola signs have replaced statues of Marx and Engels in Marx-
Engelsplatz.35 Apparently in Barber's mind the right to vote, own property,
travel, live free from fear of a midnight visit of the Stasi, visit relatives in other
European nations, read what one pleases, have individual self-determination,
and--yes--eat at McDonald's and drink Coca-Cola count for nothing. Later,
Barber describes with disdain a scene in Warsaw where people line the streets
to cheer at the sight of Coca-Cola trucks.36 Barber forgets (or does not
understand) that such scenes in Poland and elsewhere reverberated with cheers
for the political and civil freedoms that allow citizens to drink Coca-Cola. The
hideous nature of communist rule in the former Soviet empire does not exist
in Barber's account of the recent growth of capitalism. In fact, Barber equates
"Hollywood's hegemony" with Stalinist uniformity.37 It is very difficult to
take Barber seriously on the basis of such arguments.
In trying to make sense out of Barber's desire to equate capitalism with
Stalinism, I concluded that what Barber was trying to argue was that freedom
under capitalism means nothing to those without capital. Coca-Cola signs
have replaced statues of Marx and Engels in Marx-Engelsplatz, but East
Germans have no more liberty because they lack the money and resources to
enjoy "the real thing." The destruction of the Berlin Wall, under Barber's
logic, merely replaced one form of tyranny with another because East Germans
35. BARBER, supra note 2, at 6.
36. Id. at 70.
37. Id at 115.
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gained no liberty in the event. Perhaps only someone who never lived under
real tyranny, and who takes for granted the myriad benefits offered by
capitalism, could make such an argument.
Barber's glossing over of the tyranny represented by statues of Marx and
Engels in Marx-Engelsplatz comes forth in his condemnation of capitalism's
importation into the transitional democracies of the former Soviet empire. He
rejects the argument, employed by Jeffrey Sachs and others, that capitalism is
needed to establish democracy in the countries formerly under Soviet sway.
Barber believes that democracy creates the conditions for capitalism, not the
other way around. He asserts that the application of "wild capitalism" to the
countries of the former Soviet empire has caused untold social damage and
human misery: "I cannot begin to do justice to the havoc wrought by the
attempt to impose an economic solution to the problems of democracy on the
world's developing regions."38
The problems with this aspect of Barber's analysis are rife. First, Barber
asserts that democracy historically produced capitalism. His evidence for this
belief is that "only in the nineteenth century did a democratized England
embark on policies of full-scale industrialization, free trade... and economic
empire."39 In Barber's history, private enterprise apparently did not exist prior
to the English industrial revolution. Further, Barber shows no awareness
anywhere in his book that the right to own and to dispose freely of private
property is a civil right enshrined at the heart of liberal, democratic
philosophy. Private enterprise is organically related to democracy. Barber
does not even pretend to explore what he admits is "a discemable historical
correlation between democracy and capitalism;" instead, he is content to
separate, artificially and without analysis, capitalism and democracy and to pit
them against each other.'
Second, Barber claims that capitalism destroys established civil societies
in western democracies and has crushed nascent civil societies in the central
and east European countries. Numerous problems arise with such an assertion.
To begin, Barber makes no attempt to clarify what he means by civil society.
He talks about civil society as the realm of the citizen deliberating about public
38. Id. at 246.
39. Id. at 237.
40. Id.
41. Fukuyama makes a similar point when he argues that "the capitalist global economy is intimately
related in ways unacknowledged in this book to the success and stability of democracy and civil society."
Fukuyama, supra note 34, at 116.
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goods and exercising such deliberative conclusions through an activist
government to restrain the market. I think what Barber really laments is the
demise of the role of the activist, interventionist, and highly regulative
government. Barber separates capitalism from civil society--again artificially
and without analysis. This is not the place to discuss the rich literature on civil
society, but perhaps it is reasonable to assert that Barber's conception of civil
society as a source of activist government is questionable. Older liberal
conceptions of civil society included private enterprise as a core part of the
civitas. The marketplace is more than a random exchange of property; it is
where relationships are built, confidence and social order underpinned, and
wealth generated to sustain families, communities, and governments. The
impact of globalization on older notions and forms of civil society is a serious
question worth exploring. Barber does not, however, get us very far into this
question because his separation of civil society from capitalism provides no
foundation for thoughtful reflection about the impact of globalization.
Third, Barber vilifies the introduction of "wild capitalism" into developing
regions of the world. His only two detailed examples supporting this
vilification are eastern Germany and Russia, but he claims that "wild
capitalism" is taking its toll in such places as the Czech Republic and
Hungary-supposed success stories in the transition from communism to
democratic capitalism. "Wild capitalism" is Barber's term (a modification of
Solzhenitsyn's notion of "savage capitalism") for laissez-faire economics
applied to countries without effective governments or established civil
societies.4  Faced with no countervailing forces, capitalism dictates
materialistic values and destroys local culture. What is odd about Barber's
argument is that he seems to blame capitalism for everything. Although he
says it is unfair to blame capitalism for all post-communist woes, he proceeds
to do exactly that. There is virtually no analysis or even acknowledgment of
the utter disaster communism was for the politics, civil society, and economies
of the nations unfortunate enough to adopt, or have adopted for them, Stalinist
tyranny. In Russia, five years of capitalism receives more wrath from Barber
then seventy years of totalitarian oppression. Barber does not even dare to
think that the total absence of civil society in Russia could perhaps be the
result of seventy years of despotism rather than five years of fitful and
frustrating capitalist endeavors.
42. BARBER, supra note 2, at 236.
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Barber's indignation at how capitalism has been introduced into eastern
Germany and Russia also falls flat because it violates one of his own cherished
observations. Barber quickly condemns the attempt to build democratic
societies through economic development after only five years. He argues that
the claims of Jeffrey Sachs and his cohorts, that the development of democracy
and stable capitalism will take time, are empty because the time frame is one
or two generations down the road.43 While trashing the efforts being made in
Russia and eastern Germany over the last five years, Barber asserts that
"democracy, like a good book, takes time." But that is precisely the message
of Sachs and others that Barber scornfully rejects. A western-style democracy,
civil society, and free market were not, under anyone's scenario, going to be
created quickly in Russia given the horrific condition of things after
communist rule. Many serious problems would inevitably arise. While skilled
at pointing out these problems, Barber does not venture to say what should
have been done. Given his belief that democracy creates capitalism, perhaps
Barber would have advised Russia to create a democracy first, and then
develop a capitalist economy. The artificial texture of Barber's analysis
emerges in such advice, for to create a democracy without private enterprise
is a ludicrous proposition. Alternatively, perhaps Barber would have advised
a slower, more tempered introduction of capitalism to allow the government
and civil society to prepare the ramparts for the onslaught of full-scale
capitalism. But governments and civil societies need wealth to sustain their
health and vigor, and wealth comes from economic development, and
economic development most efficiently comes from capitalism.
B. Democracy, the Nation-State, and Mc World
Although much of Barber's book is really about his distaste for capitalism,
his claim that the post-modem form of capitalism symbolized by McWorld
undermines the nation-state and thus democracy deserves separate attention.
The advent of McWorld and its infotainment telesector means, in Barber's
view, that the "nation-state's days are numbered." 5 Since the nation-state
provides the best vessel for democracy, democracy's days are likewise
numbered.
43. Id. at 185.
44. Id. at 118.
45. Id at 39.
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The first problem with Barber's claim that the nation-state is in terminal
condition is that such a claim ignores basic realities of contemporary
international politics. The "nation-state is dying" thesis has become
fashionable; but, as one leading source of analysis on current world affairs,
The Economist, has pointed out, the nation-state remains surprisingly "durable,
for all the battering it has taken from 20th-century technology." Barber
repeats the argument made by many that technology has undermined the
nation-state without analyzing what is supposed to be replacing the nation-
state as the fundamental organizational unit of international relations. Barber's
assertion that international relations will become like shopping at a mall is a
poor substitute for serious analysis of an important question. Another problem
with Barber's "demise of the nation-state" thesis is that he mixes concepts too
readily. I do not interpret Barber to mean that there will no longer be a United
States of America or a France, but that the governments of nation-states are
losing sovereignty over economics and culture. Barber does not claim that
McWorld will usher in supranational entities. Rather, I think what Barber
means is that sovereignty will play a lesser role in international affairs than
before. The more exact question raised by Barber's book is whether it is
healthy for democracy to have sovereignty decrease.
Traditional liberal thinking on international relations held that economic
interdependence created the conditions needed for peace and order precisely
because governments would be less powerful. 7 Economic interdependence
was also thought to promote democracy," further strengthening peace and
limiting government. In traditional liberal thought, sovereignty needed to be
reduced in its influence.
Barber rejects all the traditional liberal principles because he distrusts
economic interdependence, disagrees that economic interdependence promotes
democracy, and wants more government and sovereignty, not less. The
trouble with Barber's stance is that it is disconnected from reality and laden
with a nostalgic romanticism. In his grim portrait of McWorld, Barber never
acknowledges the unique relations enjoyed by democratic states. Historically,
liberal states have not waged war with each other; they have enjoyed
unprecedented levels of economic interdependence, and continue to experience
46. The Nation-State is Dead. Long Live the Nation-State, ECONOMIST, Dec. 23, 1995-Jan. 5, 1996,
at 17.
47. See ROBERT GILPiN, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 31 (1987).
48. See CROPSEY, supra note 31, at 95 (interpreting Smith's position to be that commerce generates
freedom and free political institutions).
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vigorous democratic politics. Barber believes that the relations of developed
capitalist societies epitomize McWorld. Given the historical record of
relations between liberal states, we should embrace McWorld rather than
condemn it as wicked.
Barber myopically focuses on the infotainment telesector and makes movie
and television popularity the litmus test for the future health of democracy.
Sly Stallone apparently has more philosophical, political, cultural, and
economic power than the shared devotion to civil and political rights, limited
government, free enterprise, free trade, individual liberty, and peaceful
relations forged between liberal democracies in this century. Barber seems
more mesmerized by the telesector videology than do the liberal democracies
he condemns to the ash heap of history. Stallone or Schwarzenegger films
may be in bad taste, but they are not the horsemen of the democratic
apocalypse. In reality, liberal democracies engage in much more serious and
inspiring relations than Barber cares to admit.
Barber's fear of McWorld also reveals a very strong conservative streak
in his thinking. He seems to yearn for yesteryear, before McDonald's, before
MTV, before Macintosh. The development of technology and its subsequent
globalization have moved liberal democracies out of Eden, into a world with
impotent governments, disintegrating civil societies, and rampaging global
markets. The concept of civil society bears so much weight in Barber's
analysis that his failure to delve into it conceptually and historically leaves his
conclusions hollow. He appeals to some notion of civil society that is either
historical or platonic. Neither would be very helpful in addressing the future,
which is what Barber wants us to do.
Barber's nostalgia is apparent in his condemnation of the infotainment
telesector, which he claims is characterized by tasteless conformity and
monopolistic conditions."9 Most observers with an historical awareness would
admit, however, that today's communication and entertainment industry
exhibits more variety and competition than when the industry was dominated
by a few networks and movie studios. Further, Barber's complaints about the
vertical integration taking place in the media industry are more paternalistic
than pro-competitive. The monopoly Barber claims is near is not a monopoly
that reaps excess profits from consumers, which is the type of monopoly
governments have focused on through anti-trust law. There is too much
competition (and more on the way under major telecommunications reforms
49. BARBER, supra note 2, at 91.
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passed by Congress in February 199650) for a television network, telephone
company, or movie studio to attempt to exact monopoly prices from
consumers. Barber fears a cultural monopoly-a dumbing down of the
citizenry by integrated infotainment megacorporations. His dismay at the lack
of government intervention in the formation of cultural monopoly is strikingly
paternalistic-the government should regulate what you watch. The people that
commissioned the statues of Marx and Engels in Marx-Engelsplatz used to
believe the same thing.
C. Democracy, the Nation-State, and Jihad
Barber's identification of a universal force he calls "Jihad" that is
undermining the nation-state and democracy also fails to stand up under
scrutiny. Barber's Jihad includes so many different political and cultural
phenomena that it loses its analytical value. It is not very helpful to claim that
the mild, peaceful provincialism present in Europe has very much at all in
common with the violent, zealous Islamic fundamentalism of the Middle East.
Surely the differences are greater than the similarities and should thus be the
focus of attention.
Barber's claim that Jihad undermines the nation-state is also fragile. He
argues that contemporary nationalist forces attack the nation-state whereas
older nationalist movements sought to establish nation-states. Most of the
Jihad conflicts identified by Barber seek, however, to establish nation-states
from a multicultural or multinational state. The concept of the nation-state still
burns brightly. Further, Barber's example of Asian governments seeking to
keep out McWorld to preserve Asianness shows that the nation-state idea
remains vibrant and catalyzing.
Nationalism poses a risk to democracy not because the nation-state is
imperilled, but because many nationalists are not democrats. As during the
Cold War, the concept of self-determination can be put to many uses
antithetical to democracy. Barber does not recognize the similarities between
older forms of nationalism and the forms causing concerns internationally
today. The Serbian sniper in Sarajevo may listen to Madonna on his Sony
50. See Edmund L. Andrews, Communications Reshaped: The Overhaul; Congress Votes to Reshape
Communications Industry, Ending a 4-Year Struggle, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 2, 1996, at Al (stating that new
telecommunications legislation gives new competitive freedoms to telecommunications and media
companies); Edmund L. Andrews, Communications Bill Signed, and the Battles Begin Anew, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 9, 1996, at A l (noting predictions about a new era of unbridled competition).
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Walkman and wear Nike shoes while killing innocent people, but neithei
Madonna, Sony, nor Nike motivates him to pull the trigger. Passions that kill
stem from deeper, more historical sources.
D. Confederalism vs. McWorld
The ferocity of Barber's attack on the McRevolution is striking compared
to the limpness of his confederal counter-revolutionary strategy. Barber picks
confederalism because he thinks it is the only realistic option (as opposed to
world government and international law) and because he believes that
confederalism can help create a global civil society to bolster democracy's
prospects. Barber's proposed response to the McWorld-Jihad threat to
democracy is very confused.
Barber clearly fails to understand how his confederal counter-revolution
relates to the mechanics of international relations. First, Barber's confederal
strategy must be established by and among nation-states. Barber tells us,
however, that the nation-state is virtually irrelevant in today's McWorld.
Barber wants to rely in his solution on the very thing that he labored so long
to describe as nearly dead. If we accept Barber's depiction of the nation-state,
then his confederal strategy makes no sense because the actors that would have
to implement it are non-actors in McWorld. For the confederal strategy to
have any chance of success, the nation-state must be more robust than Barber
is apparently willing to allow because confederalism on a global scale to
counteract the effects of McWorld is a formidable undertaking. If the nation-
state can entertain notions of global confederalism, then it is not prostrate
before McWorld, meaning McWorld is not as devastating to the nation-state
as Barber claims. If the nation-state is as weak as Barber claims, any strategy
to counteract McWorld pits the helpless against the powerful. Either Barber's
analysis of the demise of the nation-state is exaggerated or his confederal
solution is condemned to impotency by his own analysis.
Second, in order to create a global confederation, nation-states would have
to agree to its parameters and set out such agreement in writing-in other words
a treaty. Treaties are the very stuff of international law. Barber condemns
international law, however, as useless."' Unless Barber believes that global
confederation will occur spontaneously and simultaneously across the planet,
he intends to achieve his end of global confederation through impotent means.
51. BARBER, supra note 2, at 16,292.
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If Barber's confederal idea has any promise, then he must supplement it with
a more robust, or at least more useful notion of, international law. Otherwise,
he condemns his own idea to death. The point about Barber's attitude toward
international law connects directly to the previous point about his stance on the
nation-state. State sovereignty is the foundation of international law.52 If
sovereignty is undermined by McWorld, so is international law. Barber's
analysis is consistent in this respect, but his normative argument attempts to
revive the very things he claims McWorld has enervated without ever
explaining how such emaciated institutions of international relations will
recover sufficient vigor to do battle with McWorld.
A similar criticism can be made in connection with the relationship of civil
society to global confederation. Under Barber's thinking, civil society
provides the place where public goods are debated and decisions relating to
public goods are communicated to governments. Thus, the need for global
confederalism (a public good) must be debated in civil society and forwarded
onto government as a political objective. Four problems arise with this logic.
First, according to Barber, McWorld has already undermined civil society's
deliberative powers. 3 Barber again wants to rely on something for which he
has already begun to eulogize. Second, the idea of global confederation is so
visionary that it would require all the deliberative powers of civil society to
promote. If civil society still possesses such powers, McWorld shrinks in
importance, making global confederation unnecessary. Third, Barber's
reliance on civil society as the conduit of policy from the deliberative citizenry
assumes either that all states are democratic (which he does not assume) or that
the world's democracies can lead a global confederal counter-revolution.
What Barber asks liberal democracies to do is reverse the cultural assimilation
and economic interdependence that constitute the pillars of strength for
relations between liberal states. Alternatively, Barber is asking liberal
democracies to assimilate culturally in better taste and be more discerning in
their economic interdependence. Barber wants governments to intervene
heavily in cultural and economic freedoms enjoyed and exercised by
democratic civil societies. Fourth, Barber never confronts the question why
nondemocratic states would heed the call to confederation made by liberal
democracies when such nondemocratic states are already under assault from
the companies and values of liberal democracies. The confederal idea sounds
52. IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAw 287 (4th ed. 1990).
53. BARBER, supra note 2, at 97-98.
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like an admonition for nondemocratic states to commit suicide by another
means.
Even assuming Barber has a stronger view of nation-states and
international law, he gives us no indication how, practically, the confederal
solution would be adopted or work. He merely recommends reading the
Articles of Confederation. Why states would see any wisdom in the Articles
of Confederation, and how confederation would serve national interests is
never explained. "Let's have world confederation" is a weak attempt to save
democracy from extinction.
The idea that world confederation d la Switzerland can develop a global
civil society to bolster national democracy makes a mockery out the concept
of civil society-upon which Barber places tremendous emphasis. Civil society
is, if anything, local, near-by, close to home. It is the intimacy of relations in
one's community that gives civil society its power. The very idea of a "global
civil society" is an oxymoron. Further, the only way to try to create a global
civil society is to employ heavily telecommunications, movies, television,
transnational corporations, and other aspects of the infotainment telesector.
Barber has placed himself in a Faustian dilemma: does he cut a deal with
McWorld to promote global civil society through the infotainment telesector?
Barber's solution, then, is nothing more than a sterile cry that we need to
transform the videology of the infotainment telesector to one more suitable to
the tastes of an academic intellectual. Such post-modern paternalism has a
darker side because such a transformation could only occur through the hands
of the government as Big Brother.
1I. CONCLUSION
Reading Jihad vs. McWorld is, in the end, a lot like eating a Big Mac.
Upon initial consumption, the meal seems satisfying. Upon further digestion,
however, one realizes that the initial pleasure was superficial and short-lived.
The meal does little to nourish or nurture the vitality of the body and mind. In
Jihad vs. McWorld, Barber gives us fast food political analysis and philosophy
as nourishing as a Big Mac. No wonder President Clinton liked it so much.
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